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THE UNITED NATIONS  
IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
OF THE FUTURE

BY

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
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**THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE FUTURE**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

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THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
OF THE FUTURE

*"In recent years, we have found ourselves locked in fruitless debates about the inauguration of the peacekeeping operations and over the degree of control the Security Council would exercise over peacekeeping machinery - an impasse which has insured only that permanent peacekeeping machinery would not come into being. Each peacekeeping unit we have formed has been an improvisation growing out of argument and controversy.*

*We should delay no longer. The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises."*

*- Henry Kissinger*

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Nearly forty eight years have elapsed since the Charter of the United Nations was first drafted. This was done against the backdrop of the Second World War with a serious concern that neither Germany nor Japan should ever again re-emerge as a threat to world peace. Despite this, there have been over 200 armed confrontations of varying degree between nations of different sizes; very fortunately, there has been no world-wide warfare yet. Disputes have either been controlled, contained, moderated, terminated, settled, prevented, or even negotiated, and in each case peace has somehow been brought about due to the efforts of either, the United Nations, superpowers, or regional security arrangements. While there have been certain weaknesses in the manner and method of mounting and conduct of peacekeeping opera-

tions, the United Nations has especially had to operate under a number of constraints; nonetheless, little credit has somehow been given to the United Nations for prevention of a global conflict.

Forced by history, the current system of peacekeeping by the United Nations is imperfect and suffers from a number of drawbacks; Carlos Romulo, a former United Nations President, has aptly stated, "the greatest disappointment with the United Nations has been its failure in its major mission: peacekeeping."<sup>1</sup>

Now that the Cold War has ended and communism is on the decline, there is an upsurge of democratic sentiment all over the world. A common thread stressing the values of liberty, economic justice and dignity has emerged. The demise of the Cold War marks the start of a new era for the United Nations; the beginning for a new quest for peace in this world. Under the changed circumstances, comprehensive global security can truly be achieved now through the will of the international community which, in turn, can find expression through the United Nations, and there could be no better time for it than now.<sup>2</sup>

Even though we must view the departure of communism with cautious optimism, fewer constraints and greater global dialogue today makes this switch seem a distinct reality. The changed world order has consequently placed a heavy burden on the United Nations. Preventing dispute in the international arena and peacekeeping has assumed added importance. We have delayed enough. Fortunately however, the time is opportune; more vigor therefore needs to be urged in keeping tranquility on the globe.



## Aim

Given the post-Cold War international climate, it is the intent of this study to focus on the need for a viable and proactive United Nations in the realm of peacekeeping. This analysis reviews the concept of multi-national controlled peacekeeping forces which should, in the future, be capable of ensuring security and vigilance based upon consensus, common interests, better responsiveness, joint action and international law.

## Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

Let us first briefly look at the implications and concept of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is the synonym for United Nations sanctioned international control of violence.<sup>3</sup> It has been interpreted in very many different ways. The terms peacekeeping or peace force operations tend to be used to describe a whole range of United Nations authorized military activities which are inclined to overlap and can be misleading. Authors have coined various terminologies which only tend to lead to complexities. It is best to keep the continuum simple.

Observation. On one end of the continuum are observation duties which simply involve monitoring of UN sponsored peace by the process of seeing and reporting, and involve minimum manpower and effort.

Peacekeeping. Actual peacekeeping implies the efforts of the UN to settle conflicts through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means. Peacekeepers do not distinguish between the victim and the aggressor, and require relatively limited troops.<sup>4</sup> They

are designed to keep the peace that already exists with the consent of the opposing nations or groups. The term has gradually evolved over the years; it's meaning has however, swelled in more recent times. Today it includes a host of activities as follows, all designed to manage the provisions of a mandate:

- (a) Supervision and enforcement of a cease fire, both between regular and irregular forces.
- (b) Supervision of disengagement and withdrawal.
- (c) Management and execution of agreements.
- (d) Supervision of demilitarized operations/buffer zones.
- (e) Patrolling duties.
- (f) Observation duties.
- (g) Liaison.
- (h) Maintenance of law and order.
- (i) Humanitarian assistance including protection to relief agencies for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- (j) Guarantee of rights of passage.
- (k) Sanctions.
- (m) Assistance in restoration of government.
- (n) Supervision of elections.
- (o) Assistance in restoration of essential services.

Clearly, these activities tend to extend beyond traditional peacekeeping as was interpreted in the past. To accomplish some of these tasks a larger number of troops would be needed than before, they may have to carry heavier weapons, and will have to be prepared to act offensively, when necessary, especially in civil

war situations. In fact, the diversity of operations could well be further increased in the future.

There is little difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking. The method may be different; the latter really amounts to encouraging settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation.

Peace Enforcement. At the other end of the continuum is peace enforcement. This involves readiness to use force, and the spectrum and intensity of operations can be enormous involving the use of sizable forces; the drain on the budget is therefore likely to be the greatest. As the word suggests, such operations involve pressuring, forcing or compelling nations to keep the peace by employing various means. Though covered under Article 42 of the UN Charter, peace enforcement operations have only been undertaken in the past under exceptional circumstances and that too collectively. In peace enforcement the aggressor is identified and the rationale for direct intervention may be related to a situation when:

(a) Either belligerent crosses an internationally recognized border, as in Korea or the Gulf, in which case the UN may be compelled to undertake direct military intervention to enforce peace.

(b) Alternatively, when the consent of either opponent cannot be sought to end a state of strife within, the situation can become ripe for peace enforcement, as is the case in former Yugoslavia.

(c) In certain circumstances when there is no government existing within to deal with, as in the case of Somalia, the

UN may be left with no other option but to intervene. The nature of such an action could however, vary.

The violation of the principle of consent can sometimes be viewed as an infringement of the UN Charter and pose a serious disconnect. It is also interesting to note that although peace enforcement operations have also been included in the continuum of low intensity conflict, they have been conducted twice, in Korea and the Gulf, and in both the above cases they have truly amounted to nothing short of intense wars of varying duration.

## CHAPTER II - REVIEW OF CURRENT WORLD ORDER AND IMPERATIVES

### Review of Environment

Today, communism has virtually disappeared. Most former communist nations are in a state of transition, and even though a delicate period of predicament and turbulence is most likely to inevitably follow, states are willing to move in a new direction. The barbed wire obstacles and minefields that once divided Europe are no more. Cumulatively, more nations than ever before will be amenable to truly supporting peace, and particularly, the UN in its greatly expanded role. With warming of relations between the east and the west; consensus, unanimity, common interests, collective will, unity and cooperation are key words. Removal of political constraints has thus opened a widening spectrum of operational requirements under the increasingly elastic sobriquet of peacekeeping.<sup>5</sup>

In actuality however, we are now seeing inordinate ethnicity and fundamentalism, immense nationalism and a greater number of opponents in the world today. Some of these issues were contained by the superpower balance in the past, but could now very easily erupt as regional conflicts within or between states leading to fragmentationism.<sup>6</sup> Consequently an impact could also be felt on alliances. So, while the threat of communism has very much receded, fresh challenges and threats could be posed to the world order. There is thus a clear sense of need and urgency amongst most nations to get ahead in building security.

Charter. The Charter of the UN was put together soon after the Second World War under very different and exacting circumstances. It primarily related to ensuring that another threat like Nazi Germany did not re-emerge. All this has gradually changed as those conditions have ceased to exist. However, combined with this, the emergence of the USSR as a superpower and communism also gave our fears a different twist after the Second World War. Fortunately, even that has transformed now. The conditions and compulsions are different and the environment thus conducive to review the Charter.

Alternate Options to the UN. Even though there have been setbacks, the UN solution has stood the test of time. We now need to validate afresh an effective UN sponsored security system which enjoys full backing of its members. Such a system must be forceful and capable of truly maintaining peace in the world in an environment where peacekeeping should be immune from vetoes. The time is thus most expedient to streamline the functioning of the UN as a peacekeeping body. The obtaining political climate, convergence of interests, and international acceptance have created an ideal milieu for change.

While UN peacekeeping operations are neutral and international in character, they remain largely reactive in nature and based on transient organizations that are hurriedly put together with little notice and initially limited in resources to meet specific situations. The need for an improvement in the peacekeeping environment wherein the collective effort of member nations is put together has never been felt more acutely than now. There can

however, be no stereotyped method or panacea for controlling and ending conflict. The process of healing will vary in each case as no situation is likely to be alike. In the changed world order, UN sponsored collective security can become a reality. We thus need to give a fresh look to the whole process of peacekeeping now and identify all issues that are crucial and critical in this regard and address them.

CHAPTER III - PEACEKEEPING DURING THE PAST AND  
THE CHANGING CONTEXT

*"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier  
can do it."*

- Anonymous U.N. Peacekeeping Soldier

Cold War Period 1948-88

The nature of conflict that actually developed during the Cold War period was not anticipated by the drafters of the Charter who failed to foresee the political climate that emerged on account of the rise of the world powers.<sup>7</sup> During the Cold War the Security Council failed to agree on collective enforcement mechanisms, wherein the effective projection of military power under international control to enforce international decisions against aggressors was supposed to be done, and a lesser instrument, peacekeeping, was developed to guarantee the agreements successfully negotiated under UN auspices.<sup>8</sup> Peacekeeping, therefore, was an expedient of a divided Security Council that lacked the consensus for collective action but could agree to use a less powerful instrument that would not impinge on the superpower zero-sum game.<sup>9</sup>

Moral Pressure. Peacekeeping forces were drawn from small and non-aligned countries. They were lightly armed, neutral troops with members of the Security Council and major powers making troop contributions only under exceptional circumstances. Troops functioned under constrained parameters and rarely used force and that too in self defense, as a last resort. The influence of the



UN peacekeepers during this period resulted from the moral weight of the international community rather than their military prowess.<sup>10</sup>

Evolution of Peacekeeping. The UN Charter was designed to protect the sovereignty of nations, uphold the need to safeguard them against aggression, and where disputes arose, either settle them, or failing that, enforce settlement. As the UN expanded, so did its problems. The original Charter did not include the concept of peacekeeping, as this was not foreseen over the years. The expression was first used by the UN in 1956 to supervise a truce between Egypt and Israel following a conflict between them. Since then, it has come to be a major UN responsibility. The UN has since, very frequently employed contingents on peacekeeping missions. Missions have had several uncommon characteristics. Each peacekeeping operation has been unique and has presented a different set of situations. Peacekeepers have only operated after the cessation of hostilities. Operations have normally been fluid, unclear and uncertain, with varying degrees of tension and the possibility of violence not being ruled out.

Peace Not a Guarantee. Peacekeeping operations were created essentially to defend the status quo. Missions could halt conflict so that nations could be brought to the negotiating table, but did not however, guarantee the outcome of negotiations. Operations were easier to terminate than dismantle and often created a vacuum with serious consequences as was the case in 1967 at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War.<sup>11</sup> Numerous missions either failed or ran

into difficulty. However, "where UN peacekeeping force were allowed to operate, as in Cyprus, the operation was successful."<sup>12</sup>

The international misconception of peacekeeping was seriously challenged during UN operations in the Congo in 1964 where the concept of 'blasting' the forces into submission was questioned at the time and in retrospect is assessed to have failed. The public expectation of peacekeeping was severely dented again in 1967 when the troops of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), deployed between the Israeli and Egyptian armies, were withdrawn at the insistence of Egypt on whose territory they were stationed. After this withdrawal, a more realistic perception of the limitations of peacekeeping operations began to emerge.<sup>13</sup>

The effectiveness of the UN as an institution was also debatable. The peacekeeping organization and control of peacekeeping bypassed the Military Staff Committee.<sup>14</sup> Staff at the UN in New York were weak because they were not under any military pressure. Peacekeepers had no enemies, and in the field there was no need for a continuous night and day reliability.<sup>15</sup> The pressure on the UN secretariat was, in turn, removed and an effective staff was not maintained. Every time the need arose, planning was carried out by a staff, most of whom were civilians hurriedly called up on a make-shift basis to carry out military planning. Operational lessons were thus irrevocably lost.<sup>16</sup> There was never any continuity. Every time a new mission was to be launched, many mistakes were made and no lessons were ever learned or carried forward. There was thus a virtual stalemate in the UN.

### Post Cold War Period

1988 was the first time that the Soviets shifted their position in the UN. They called for improvements in the UN's peacekeeping role and offered troops. This marked a turning point in peacekeeping. From here onward, regular collaboration amongst major powers in the Security Council finally seemed possible. Clandestine support to proxy forces was abandoned in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Somalia.<sup>17</sup> Peacekeeping operations were re-vitalized, to a degree. UN forces were deployed after a 10 year gap (since the contested UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1978). Thirteen new operations were launched in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Iran-Iraq border, Somalia, Western Sahara and former Yugoslavia.<sup>18</sup>

These operations incorporated some new features: a large number of civilians were employed with the troops in Namibia and Central America, weapons were collected from insurgents in Nicaragua and domestic elections supervised.<sup>19</sup> This was a classic case of peacekeeping combined with peace enforcement. The possibility of more such cases occurring in the future cannot be ruled out now. The operations in Somalia are unique; there is no government whatsoever, there is no spokesman, there is nobody who can give consent to the UN's employment, but the masses want the UN.

In 1990, the largest ever peace enforcement operation was successfully launched in the Gulf which was American led. Desire as we might, the UN had neglected to develop a proper doctrine or

machinery for peace enforcement. While large scale enforcement operations, of the kind that the Gulf was, will invariably be controlled by the superpower/major powers, the UN should have had a system to monitor the process. The inadequacy of the current doctrine is also being currently tested in the peacekeeping operations under way in Cambodia. The situation in each case is unique, and qualitatively and quantitatively different from the past. These operations are more than and well beyond just peacekeeping as we knew it in the past. They indicate new challenges and new dangers. In the case of Yugoslavia and Cambodia there is a distinct likelihood of the operations combining with or transitioning from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

#### The Changing Context

We now need a fresh focus on the conceptual and operational changes that will be necessary to back up the post Cold War thought process on the entire spectrum of UN sponsored peacekeeping operations. Sir Brian Urquhart had summarized the characteristics of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War period as follows:

- (a) Consent of the parties.
- (b) Continuing strong support of the Security Council.
- (c) A clear and practicable mandate.
- (d) Non-use of force except in the last resort and in self-defense.
- (e) Willingness of troop contributors to furnish military troops.

(e) Willingness of member states to make available requisite financing.<sup>20</sup>

These axioms are valid but, do not hold entirely good for peace enforcement; the changed and broadened concept of peacekeeping may also no longer subscribe to using force only as a last resort and in self-defense where duties such as the guarantee of rights of passage, etc are involved. In this context it would be worthwhile recapitulating the salient points of the Secretary General's agenda for peace and the response of the head of the only superpower.

Proposals of UN Secretary General. The Secretary General observed in early 1992 that "the organization has almost too much credibility now,"<sup>21</sup> and called for a fresh agenda to strengthen the UN's ability to prevent, contain and resolve conflict. He has reminded the world that there is a need to ensure that the lessons of the past four decades are learned and that the errors are not repeated.<sup>22</sup> The Security Council also beckoned the Secretary General "to analyze the next step in the evolving UN peace system."<sup>23</sup> And even though the big question remains - how can the international community act together to prevent war - the need and mandate for change in our approach to peacekeeping operations is apparent.

Proposals of the US President. In a landmark address to the UN General Assembly on 21 Sep 92, President Bush said, "I welcome the Secretary General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the UN's ability to prevent, contain and resolve conflict across the

globe...we will work with the UN to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations...and we will offer our capabilities for joint simulations and exercises to strengthen our ability to undertake joint peacekeeping operations...I have further directed the establishment of a peacekeeping curriculum in US military schools...the US is prepared to make available our bases and facilities for multi-national training and field exercises. One such area nearby, with facilities, is Fort Dix...the US is willing to provide our military expertise to the UN to help the UN strengthen its planning and operations for peacekeeping."<sup>24</sup> Additionally, certain proposals have also been put forth by the US recently for enhancing the effectiveness of the UN which include<sup>25</sup>:

- (a) Strengthening the role of the Security Council in settlement of disputes.
- (b) Strengthening UN peacekeeping capability including development of member nations trained contingents for rapid deployment.
- (c) Addressing disarmament and arms control questions more effectively, and enforcement of agreements.

The American response underscores a joint tone, hits at the heart of the issue, and is most opportune. It has presented a major step in the direction for change which needs to be pursued vigorously. We must focus on the conceptual and operational changes that will be necessary to back up the fresh thoughts on

collective security and peacekeeping as proposed by the Secretary General.

#### CHAPTER IV - LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS

*"The failure of many UN member states to use the instruments of peacekeeping within the UN and their negative attitude toward international peacekeeping in general have been obstacles to the UN becoming a positive and practical influence in the settlement of disputes. Its potential has been ignored and often bypassed."*

- Indarjit Rikhye.<sup>26</sup>

History has shown that each peacekeeping force is unique and has differed from the other in the political circumstances of its deployment, the opposing forces they were required to act between, and their composition. Some forces were sponsored by the UN, others by NATO or other regional security organizations, or by USA. Some failed, others succeeded.

Peacekeeping has so far counted on perfunctory UN presence and the concurrence of contesting nations rather than an effective military potential. Today, the commitment has increased to a point that the UN resources have virtually outstripped its capability as an arbitrator of peace. In 1970, U. Thant, as the Secretary General, expressed his concerns on the need to develop an effective international peacekeeping apparatus within the framework of the UN Charter. The guiding rules enumerated below still represent the fundamental issues that must be borne mind while structuring a sound and effective machinery to meet the requirements of international conflict control today; until this is done, any realistic system of collective security and safeguards will remain an



unfulfilled wish:

- (a) Missions often can only be undertaken at the request or with the consent of governments who reserve their right of option to request their removal at any time desired by them.
- (b) The question of greater involvement of the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee in the day-to-day direction and administration of peacekeeping operations.
- (c) The practicability of preplanning for peacekeeping missions and the extent to which the Military Staff Committee should be responsible.
- (d) The desirability of establishing standby UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>27</sup>

Subsequently, when the UNEF II was deployed in the Suez in 1973, the Secretary General amplified his guidance rules that the force was required to follow. These are as under; they need to be adhered to equally in the changed context if peacekeeping is to be successful:

- (a) Deploy only with the full confidence and backing of the Security Council.
- (b) Deploy only with the full cooperation and assent of the host countries.
- (c) Once deployed, the force itself must be under the command of the UN through the Secretary General.
- (d) Enjoy complete freedom of movement in the host countries.
- (e) Be international in composition, comprising contingents from nations which are acceptable to the host countries.

(f) Act impartially.

(g) Use force only in self defense.

(h) Be supplied and administered under the UN arrangements.<sup>28</sup>

The Secretary General worked on the pre-supposition that peacekeeping operations would be temporary in nature. This is not likely to be the case today; operations in Cyprus (1964), India-Pakistan border (1949), Southern Lebanon (1978), Golan Heights (1974) and Arab-Israeli cease fire (1948) have shown it to be to the contrary.<sup>29</sup> Neither of the above issues concentrates on peace enforcement operations either.

With this as a backdrop, we need to focus on why the UN didn't achieve some of its aims in peacekeeping in the past. Even prior to 1988 some of the drawbacks were understandable, however, several of them could have been resolved, but this was somehow never done.

#### UN Charter

Article 43. Article 43 of the Charter specifically calls for the earmarking of armed forces by all member states for use at the discretion of the Security Council on its call as the latter may deem necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. It calls for special agreements or arrangements with member nations to govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided."<sup>30</sup> This creates a special relationship between the nations and the Security Council. By this, the Council would have the right to deploy and employ such forces of other sovereign states. States have however, been

reluctant to implement this which is not surprising." The fact is that no incentive exists for smaller nations on whom the peacekeeping burden may fall, to bind themselves to the authority of the Security Council and thus the big powers. Even though such states have made forces available on voluntary basis, the Article as such, remains a non-starter, and operations have been hampered and activated on an impermanent basis.

Article 45. Article 45 of the Charter amplifies that in order to take urgent military measures, member nations shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The exact nature of forces would be laid down by an agreement with the Security Council.<sup>32</sup> This has never been done by states either, because there are so many constraints.

#### Collective Security and the Veto

*"The UN has rarely been able to take a forceful position in peacekeeping, without the veto hobbling its actions, or a party to the conflict refusing to let it be negotiated."*

- Indarjit Rikhye

The contentious issue lies in the exercising of a veto and its effect, and the decision of whether to resort to peacekeeping or collective enforcement. Experience has indicated that "the collective security scheme, based on the assumption that the big powers acting in unison, would deal with any threat to security, regardless of its source, has not stood the test of time. Though the major burden for its failure has been placed on the existence of the veto power (most frequently used by the former Soviet

Union), the problem is much more complex. No country and much less the superpowers, has agreed to an enforcement action that might directly or indirectly jeopardize its own national interest. The UN as a world body without the support of the big powers or even of only one, could lack the resources to implement its peacekeeping resolutions. Operations could not have been accomplished without assistance from the big powers. It is only the will of the big powers with their will to exercise political, economic, and military influence, that could have made the UN an effective instrument of peace."<sup>33</sup>

Power play has in the past frustrated peacekeeping. With the Soviet Union ceasing to exist, the problem of the power of veto as an impediment has been substantially reduced. This is however, not to suggest that other members of the Council will not resort to its use of the future. The level of use of collective force has been dependent on the level of accord, understanding, and cooperation between nations of the world, and the degree of military cooperation amongst them.<sup>34</sup> With increased tolerance and interaction amongst nations, the use of collective force has a better chance for implementation. We have also witnessed more peacekeeping operations than enforcement action. This low profile action in place of a collective security system undertaken by the UN, has provided a buffer between the hostile parties, prevented or stopped fighting, supervised cease-fire lines, and possibly kept the big powers from getting involved.<sup>35</sup>

## The U.N. Bureaucracy

Security Council. The Security Council was originally formed from the superpowers and potentially great powers. It could have been more effective in acting in unison and upholding the Charter, but faltered in exploiting its clout. It failed too often to act to prevent war because of disagreement or because it was known that one permanent member or another would use its veto power to render the Council powerless to act.<sup>36</sup> Thus, in the past, "the deadlock between the superpowers over matters of procedure and principle and the inflexibility of their positions in the Security Council prevented any real progress in developing any new concepts for peacekeeping."<sup>37</sup>

Higher Management of Peacekeeping. The peacekeeping management at the UN headquarters has suffered from a number of drawbacks:

(a) This department has been unable to effectively control the large number of peacekeeping forces. It has a persistent shortage of military planners. Being limited, the military staff cannot undertake any worthwhile administrative functions.

(b) Their duties are restricted to only planning and advice. Once the Security Council approves an operation, operational planning is done by the Department of Peacekeeping while the Field Operations Division does the resources planning. The latter has no experienced planners and the whole process is sluggish.

(c) The peacekeeping organization has no financial staff of its own. Finances are handled by the Field Operations Division and budgets are usually prepared after the Security Council authorizes an operation. Funds have to then be obtained through donations and partly through the use of existing assets. Peacekeeping force commanders have little control over financial matters. Civilian officers are subordinated from the Field Operations Division to control all finances in the field and their responses depend on their relations with the military.

Military Security Committee. The Military Security Committee was designed to act like a joint chiefs committee of the UN. It has been in cold storage since 1947 and bypassed in the channel of peacekeeping control. In sum, peacekeeping operations have been constrained by the make-shift military organization of the UN Secretariat.

### Finances

The financial base of the UN has never been firm. UN mismanagement of funds is well known and documented. No proper financial managers or seasoned administrators exist. Nearly half the annual budget is used by the UN headquarters alone. "Peacekeeping operations, some of which drag on for decades, have become a source of soaring costs with minimal oversight. In a \$1.7 billion operation in Cambodia, five times more money is budgeted for newspaper and magazine subscriptions for the UN troops than for external auditing."<sup>38</sup> There is also an exceptionally high level of

unpaid contributions by member countries and an inadequate working budget.<sup>39</sup>

#### Reactive Nature of Operations

Mounting of Operations. The current sequence for mounting an operation does not allow for rapid reaction for the following reasons:

- (a) Little or no direction is given by the UN headquarters.
- (b) It is not the machinery alone that requires attention. Past experience has emphasized the practical problems that have arisen in the execution of multinational peacekeeping operations as these have been assembled contingent on a situation and engineered on an as required basis. Since a standing force has never been maintained, troops have been hurriedly assembled and a force put together in a totally ad hoc and hurried manner. This kind of fire brigade action needs to be avoided.
- (c) Transient organizations inevitably lead to wide extremes of military knowledge and professionalism among the contingents of the various contributing nations, which has made the process of mounting peacekeeping forces extremely complex.<sup>40</sup>
- (d) Once the Security Council approves deployment, financial backing is sought. Besides other problems, lack of financial resources has, at the outset, inhibited rapid reaction and smooth mounting of operations.
- (e) Lack of troop lift capability.

Hurriedly assembled multinational forces have also created problems in the conduct of missions. Operations have suffered because of:

- (a) Lack of integration of multinational forces.
- (b) Non-standardized training.
- (c) Incompatibility in communications.
- (d) Equipment interoperability problems.
- (e) Incompatibility in language within the force.
- (f) Variation in eating, drinking and living habits of troops.
- (g) Possible lack of knowledge of the language of the belligerent nation(s).
- (h) Lack knowledge of terrain, climate and local conditions obtaining.
- (i) Need for conditioning, and sometimes acclimatization of troops.

Administrative Problems. These include problems in logistics, transportation, troop lifting capability and lack of a proper logistics infrastructure. The UN has never possessed a logistics base worth the name. No help other than logistics and movement has normally been provided by permanent members of the Security Council. Logistics have to be organized from scratch in the area of operations. This takes time, resources and finances. Often, adequate troop lift capability may not be available.



Area of Responsibility of Missions. The area of responsibility will vary in shape and size. This can aggravate some of the above mentioned problems.

Lack of Intelligence. This has been a persistent problem. Even though the UN has tended to view gathering of intelligence as an intrusive device amounting to a hostile act, "collection and distribution of economic, statistical and other information is an important function of the UN,"<sup>41</sup> and there is a need to move beyond in this sphere. There is no system of collecting peacetime information and intelligence of potentially troubled spots. Even after the UN commits a force, this force has no proper organization for feed back of information and intelligence. This is a serious handicap and tends to effect the tempo and efficacy of peacekeeping forces who need all available information to ensure the successful conduct of operations.

Command and Control. Force commanders are sometimes poorly selected and have no proper upward channel of reporting on a regular basis either. Command, control and communication arrangements at the UN headquarters are inadequate and only partially manned; they neither possesses proper command and control facilities to continually monitor peacekeeping operations. The geographical spread of peacekeeping forces and duration of operations also results in loose and fragmented command and control within the force.

In essence, the degree to which forces are restricted in their functions is governed by the limitations laced upon them by the

decisions of the Security Council and the principles upon which the Council bases its decisions and directives.<sup>42</sup> Peacekeeping is thus narrowly constrained. There is a need to search for a better mechanism.

#### Other Issues

Sovereignty of Troops. The problem of resolving the sovereignty issue when troops are placed under command of UN force commanders has not demonstrated any major worry where forces from relatively small nations have been employed. However, this can be disparate when it becomes necessary to apply large scale forces and troops from superpowers/ major powers for maintaining peace. Very recently, the UN Commander of Peacekeeping Forces in Croatia (UNPROFOR), who belonged to a third world country, resigned because British troops placed under him refused to obey his orders. This issue is likely to have further implications and presents serious concern and needs addressal.

Apparent Lack of Trust and Confidence in Certain Host Nations Providing Peacekeeping Forces. Despite the fact that UN peacekeeping forces are selected with care after due approval of the countries concerned, some times certain troops do not find favor with the local populace and are in a sense not welcome, as was the case in El Salvador. This can result in serious problems in the actual conduct of peacekeeping.

Relationships with Regional Security Organizations. Regional security organizations like the NATO, ASEAN, ANZUS, OAU or OAS could certainly have reduced the burden on the UN and, also the

superpowers in certain cases. They have however, not played a pivotal or aggressive role in ensuring peace in their regions. The NATO failed to take the lead in resolving the former Yugoslavia issue. Some organizations have also lacked credibility. Prior to the arrival of the recent US lead UN sponsored operations in Somalia, the OAU was never welcome. There have been virtually no formal links or understandings between regional organizations and the UN either. If we accept the need for these organizations to spearhead regional peace initiatives the question arises as to whether they should work with or under the UN, or is there a need to create special regional peacekeeping organizations.

## CHAPTER V - OPTIONS FOR A CHANGED SYSTEM AND A POSSIBLE PROFILE

*"The use of military force by the UN for these purposes - enforcement and peacekeeping - is surely essential to the world order in which international security is heavily dependent on the Security Council."*

- Bruce Russett.<sup>43</sup>

The most important pre-requisite to successful peacekeeping, besides consent, is a strong backing. An unequivocal consensus with the backing of the only superpower and great powers, besides member nations, is the only way in which peacekeeping missions will be successfully accomplished. History has shown that without this presupposition peacekeeping operations are unlikely to succeed, as was apparent in the case of the Gulf War. Even in the case of Nicaragua, had the US not given its unequivocal backing it is doubtful whether the way to peace would have been paved. In the eventual analysis, the UN draws its strength from the principle players and all its members. Its membership must therefore, be promptly enlarged and extended to all countries.

A three-pronged thrust appears necessary to refurbish the UN's profile:

- (a) Clean up house and internal management with a view to achieving optimum resource efficiency.
- (b) Establish more credibility and achieve greater willingness by all member states so that the need for intervention is minimized.

(c) Once the need arises to intervene, apply resources effectively with promptness, and assure success.

#### The UN Bureaucracy

Security Council. The role of the Council needs addressal primarily in the following spheres:

- (a) Prevention of the veto.
- (b) Strengthening and expansion of the Council.

A consensus view by the Council, or minimum use of the veto by it can bolster world-wide peace. Evidently, this appears idealistic and may only be possible if the right climate exists between the powers that be; and so long as there is a divergence of interests between these nations, the veto will continue to be used. A counter view could rest upon the argument which questions the very right of the power of veto being only restricted to permanent members of the Security Council when other nations are kept out. In that case, a more democratic approach could be taken based on majority vote tied in with an expanded Council, rather than the veto or an absolute vote.

Major General Indarjit Rikhye, a senior advisor for UN affairs has rightly suggested that the Security Council should devise and implement a program for preventive diplomacy to include preventive peacekeeping, and the Secretary General should be free to send his envoys and military observers to potentially volatile areas in the world.<sup>44</sup> This merits consideration. The debate for an expanded permanent membership of the Security Council to include emerging major regional/economic powers like Japan, Germany,

Brazil, or India, could be considered. This will widen the Council's base and also help strengthen regional arrangements on account of the nexus that will exist between these nations and their regions. However, more members could mean greater possibilities of dissention and slowing down of the UN's response.

Higher Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Once peace missions are approved by the Security Council, all matters related to peace force operations should be handed over to the Secretary General whose peacekeeping management machinery could be re-aligned as under:

(a) The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Affairs (USGPA) should constitute the Secretary General's peacekeeping planning and decision making staff. He should attend all discussions by the latter related to political, peacekeeping and military affairs and tender advice.

(b) The Military Advisor must be carefully chosen to act as the chief of joint staff and fulfill all military functions. He should likewise attend all such related discussions. His office should be expanded to handle the enlarged peacekeeping spectrum, and be broken down into planning, operations and training branches. These should include intelligence, operations, weapons/equipment, communications, logistics and personnel cells.

(c) All military administrative functions to include logistics, budgeting, material, and manpower must be handled

independently by the Field Operations Division under the Secretary General.<sup>45</sup>

(d) These three departments must have a mix of both military and civilian personnel. Member nations must provide more support. The number of military officers needs to be increased. Retired/UN experienced officers could also easily be employed.

Sound Command and Control Arrangements. With 13 peacekeeping missions stretching across the world and a 60,000 peacekeeper force, a round-the-clock operations room must be established at the Military Advisor's Secretariat. Dedicated, secure voice and data communication links to all missions need to be established.

#### Better Management of Finances

This seems to be the most difficult issue to resolve. Waste, mismanagement of funds and the tendency to become entangled in endless debates will never contribute to the control of funds. There is an urgent need to review how we fund peacekeeping and explore new ways to ensure adequate support for peacekeeping forces. Measures could include:

(a) Streamlining of the executive management at the UN headquarters. The existing structure is bulky and a drain on the UN's finances. There is plenty of scope for pruning and down-sizing.

(b) The UN, and the peacekeeping organization in particular, must have a firm financial base. To begin with, member states must liquidate all outstanding debts.

(c) Member states could, in the future, include their contributions to the UN in their defense budgets which usually get passed much more easily than foreign aid.<sup>46</sup>

(d) The Secretary General's proposal for a UN Peace Endowment Fund with an initial capital of \$1 billion created by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions, with the latter sought from Governments and the private sector, is laudable and should be implemented. Investments of the principal capital would be used for peacekeeping and other conflict resolution measures.<sup>47</sup>

(e) In the field, civilian and military staff must be combined. This will remove duplication and help exercise economy.

(f) Force commanders must be vested with adequate financial authority to the degree that it favors smooth conduct of operations.

(g) Wasteful expenditure must be cut down by peacekeeping missions too. Standard reasonable norms must be laid down for expenses in equipment and allowances.

(h) Other cost saving measures could be identified by an experts committee which could be appointed to critically review the existing establishment of the UN with a view to trimming it and making it more cost effective.

(i) The entire system should be subject to external audit by an international body to be nominated by and function under



the aegis of the Secretary General himself. All assets must also be audited.

### Settlement of Disputes

Preemption of Conflict. Only a strong UN can preempt conflict. This must be the starting point of the new order as the UN is now in a position to act. However, disputes among members can generally be settled in the UN only if international assistance is consensus backed and strong, and regarded by parties as helpful, or if the parties are responsive to world opinion as expressed through the UN.<sup>48</sup> "If two or more governments really wish to settle a quarrel in a dignified way without loosing face, the UN can provide the necessary facilities."<sup>49</sup> The need for the General Assembly to now exercise such a strong harmonizing influence to have the collective strength and will to reach consensus agreements in order to solve disputes can thus be helpful and pre-empt conflict. The UN should additionally consider sending troops to sensitive or threatened borders as a pre-emptive measure. In the past it was paramount that sound political decisions and not relative military balance between opposing states precede or underwrite a successful UN mandate. Today, as the intensity of operations increases, the importance of military strength also needs to be taken note of in the execution of peace. At the level of threshold of peace enforcement, it becomes an overriding key to success.<sup>50</sup>

### Proactive Operations

The UN has to move from a reactive stance to a proactive posture. Peacekeeping forces must deploy with minimum delay. This implies the need for standby forces and a high state of readiness and training. Initially, in any contingency, there may be confusion, but the faster such forces are deployed, the greater are the possibilities of accomplishing a meaningful truce.

Identification of Potential Areas of Conflict. We must continually look ahead and endeavor to identify potential areas of conflict. Such contingency planning will be beneficial from all angles.

Identification of all Parties in Conflict. Sometimes, all parties involved in the conflict may not be clearly identified and taken into confidence, as was the case in Somalia where there was no government in power. This needs watching as it could result in the peace process being prolonged or even stalled.

Collection and Dissemination of Information. Information cannot be collected overnight. Collection and collation of information, both military and political, must be an ongoing process. This can only be possible if potential areas are identified in advance and suitably targeted, and day to day monitoring done in advance. Dissemination of intelligence collected in anticipation must be effected the moment a force is selected and nominated for a particular peacekeeping task. From hereon the position is different, the information base initially established by the UN headquarters can continue to be supplemented

by it, and more importantly, built up by the force commander himself. This calls for a change in attitude and a flexible approach by the UN. It must establish a proper intelligence collection machinery backed by the superpower, which is overt in nature and countries encouraged to cooperate; non-willingness on the part of member countries to share a certain level of information will render the system a non-starter. As a beginning, all members of the Council and major powers must part with whatever they are willing to share.

Reduction of Reaction Time. The provision of troops is best done on a voluntary basis by member countries. The reaction time could be minimized by:

- (a) The UN identifying potential nations that will provide such an effort and entering into specific agreements with them.
- (b) Initially maintaining round-the-clock communications with these nations, and subsequently with the force commander.
- (c) Earmarking of Quick Reaction Forces by such nations which would constitute the initial nucleus reaction to be effective on the ground in a laid down time frame, say 24-48 hours, and act as the pathfinders.
- (d) The reaction time of the initial and main forces should be laid down by the UN and mutually agreed without directly identifying the target country, which should ideally be less than 30 days for the main force.

Acceptance of U.N. Troops by Host Nations. Contingents must be selected very carefully for each contingency so that they are willingly accepted by the opposing parties to the conflict. Opposing nations must be encouraged to accept the composition of peacekeeping detachments (with a single head) without hesitation to enforce the aims of the Council. This will contribute to a swift and smooth transition to peace.

Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement

The choice between peacekeeping and peace enforcement may pose a dilemma. If both or all the belligerents do not accept UN intervention, then there would be no choice but to exercise the latter option. However, whatever be the option, military peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations as such should be accepted internationally as the province of the UN, unless exercised by a regional pact.<sup>51</sup>

Today it is possible to extend peacekeeping to also be preventive in nature by the creation of forces which could respond to situations with a view to prevent an imminent conflict. Peace enforcement has been authorized twice in its history by the Security Council. The first time this was done was the Korean War of 1950, and the second the Gulf War of 1990-91. Enforcement distinguishes itself from peacekeeping, and really implies a collective reaction to secure peace. It should in the future be preceded by a pre-emptive show of force so that, where possible, armed action is avoided. The enforcing party must act in the capacity of an impartial referee to assist in the settlement of a

dispute between the warring parties. Even though authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the use of the sword to maintain peace and security as a remedial means must preferably be avoided. Enforcement is not viable or realistic at lower levels and must remain at the higher plane where big powers are in some way involved.<sup>52</sup> It also presupposes that the aggressor nation must have been clearly identified. Peacekeeping in its broadest sense must remain "a concept of peaceful action, not of persuasion by force, where the fundamental principles are those of objectivity and non alignment with the parties to the dispute, ideally to the extent of total detachment from the controversial issues at stake. The 'weapons' of the peacekeeper in achieving his objectives, must primarily remain those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy and reasoning, tact and the patience of a job - not the rifle."<sup>53</sup>

#### Possible Options for a More Responsive Role

Keeping the above in view, options available to fulfill a more responsive role could include:

- (a) UN sponsored peacekeeping forces tailored to deal with specific requests.
- (b) Creation of a UN Standing Army designed for peacekeeping or to enforce peace.
- (c) A new breed of UN sponsored multi-national standby forces enforce or keep the peace.

#### Peacekeeping Forces Tailored to Deal With Specific Situations.

This option is well known and has been repeatedly employed in the past. The UN identifies its commitment, requests host nations who

move their forces for each mission. This method of peacekeeping has been employed since the inception of the UN and its shortcomings and drawbacks have been analyzed in depth at Chapter 4 above. Even though the UN was proactive in defending the sovereignty of Kuwait and the message that coalition forces can act to stop aggression and enforce peace reached the world, this was a special case and may not serve as model for the future. Since peace enforcement operations will be superpower lead the UN tends to assume a backstage role, and may not even necessarily concur with all the actions taken by such forces. Such operations will also tend to appear one sided in nature as the principle of consent and acceptability would be violated.<sup>54</sup> That being the case peace is not truly been kept. Thus, peace enforcement should only be exercised when other avenues fail.

Creation of a UN Standing Army to Conduct Peacekeeping or Enforce Peace. The placement of troops permanently at the disposal of the UN, though ideal and desirable, has never worked historically and does not appear a practical answer. No nation will be prepared to place its resources under permanent control of the UN as they can ill-afford such initiatives. They would rather down-size instead. Even the only superpower, is currently drawing down not only on account of the threat of the Cold War having disappeared, but also from the point of view of economy. So, even though nations may be willing to, their ability to specifically maintain standing forces for UN peacekeeping is a far cry as the

burden would be too heavy. This option is therefore, very likely to be a non-starter for the following reasons:

(a) It needs colossal financing. Will it be cost effective and viable, and who would be willing to produce such monies? The UN has serious funding problems. The US would not want to bear the burden either.

(b) Being 'nobody's baby' this is likely to become a source for large scale financial mismanagement and corruption.

(b) When it comes to actually seconding troops permanently to the UN, it is very unlikely that nations will come forth and place their forces at the UN's disposal.

New Breed of Standby Forces. This envisages the concept of creating standby forces which can act swiftly and offensively to either, prevent war by resorting to preventive peacekeeping, or conduct peacekeeping operations as such, or peace enforcement when this becomes necessary. This new breed of the UN sponsored organization would be standby in nature and will represent true impartial peacekeepers; they will, more importantly, be prepared to deter aggression before it starts. This implies that willing member nations must be:

(a) Prepared to sign agreements with the UN.

(b) Earmark such troops, train individually and jointly, and integrate them based on a common doctrine, but otherwise be free to employ them in the normal manner within their country.

(c) When called for by the UN, despatch them as a rapid reaction, and subsequently, as a main force, in a time frame that would have been fixed in the agreement.

(d) When called upon to do so, immediately subordinate such military assets to a multinational command.<sup>55</sup>

In this manner UN operations can be well timed and drawbacks like ad hocism circumvented and any power play prevented. Since nations cannot exclusively maintain standing armies for this purpose, earmarking of standby troops is the closest answer. Training of potential peacekeeping forces on a common doctrine will certainly assist in bringing down the reaction time. A common venue, as is being suggested by the US, could be used only in certain cases, to only help in integration, overcome interoperability and compatibility problems. A pre-emptive show of force by deploying these forces in advance will help prevent conflict and will be in keeping with the future in the context of a strong UN.

#### Suggested Option

A proposal that will focus on the future to deal with change would be best suited. There is a need to re-constitute specifically earmarked troops by drawing up agreements with willing nations. The host country could periodically rotate the designated troops. On the balance, the third option therefore, appears to offer maximum advantages for peacekeeping operations especially as the current climate is conducive to such a change.



## Other Issues to Strengthen the Peacekeeping Process

Training, Communications, Lift and Administration. These must include the following measures:

(a) Joint Doctrine. A joint doctrine for UN peacekeeping forces must be formulated and issued to all member countries. This could be followed up by producing standing operating procedures.

(b) Joint Training. Troops earmarked must participate in joint training exercises periodically. This will help in integrating forces, and cement each nation's commitment to the UN, and lend cohesion. A nucleus of staff could be trained in the US on a regular basis.

(c) Lift Capability. Sound troop lifting capability is an important factor to success. This will have to be a pooled effort amongst nations employing air, sea and surface means, with the superpower and other great powers providing maximum assistance.

(d) Communications. Sound compatible communications can be organized with joint training and certain additional assistance.

(e) Administration. Issues bearing on the organization of force, logistics and international law need ironing out and standardization. Logistics equipment must not be abandoned on conclusion, but recycled. Maximum logistics resources should be pooled from member nations.

Rules of Engagement. This is an area of concern. Rules of engagement will be limited to situations where both sides have the will to peace, or where it may become necessary to use force against one. That means that rules of engagement cannot be universally applied.<sup>56</sup> They must be formulated by the UN along with its decision to employ peacekeeping forces, and disseminated to peacekeeping forces before they arrive at the area of operations. As the situation develops the reaction of opposing factions is likely to vary which will call for a review of the rules of engagement. This will have to be done by the force commander and subsequently formalized by the UN. If the UN has to develop a proactive stance, rules of engagement must be designed to allow UN troops greater leeway than hitherto.

Sovereignty and Control of UN Troops. President Bush has stated that, "member states, as always, must retain the final decision on the use of their troops...but we must develop our ability to coordinate peacekeeping efforts so that we can mobilize quickly when a threat to peace arises, or when people in need look to the world for help."<sup>57</sup> Member nations will only be willing to unhesitatingly place their troops and resources under the command of the UN if they are reassured of the organization's credibility. This must be convincingly built up. An unambiguous command structure which is directly controlled by the Secretary General and his staff will also belie all doubts in this regard and help in the successful conduct of large scale peacekeeping operations. The command structure must invariably be such that the homogeneity of

units and even brigades is never broken. Troops must always answer their own commanders. It is only in the higher rung of the command chain that commanders from one nation would have to answer another in conformity with the approved chain. Multiplicity in the chain of command in amorphous organizations can lead to serious problems; a single chain of command system must invariably be adopted. Once committed to peacekeeping or enforcement, all nations must conform to the existing chain of command. If this fundamental principle is broken, it will hit at the very basis of the UN's existence. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations will never run concurrently. The latter will invariably follow the former, in which case the command and control should go over to the commander of the enforcement body as it will invariably be a larger force.

#### Use of Troops From the US or Major Powers for Peacekeeping.

The question arises as to whether it is in the interests of the world body to have troops belonging to the US, or major powers, included in peacekeeping operations, and if so, is it in the interests of such nations to send forces. Ideally, superpowers must retain their image of true neutrality, and only commit their combat troops where a situation of serious concern to regional or world-wide stability, such as peace enforcement, warrants their presence. As such, whilst they must continue to provide all other support, US and other major power troop commitment should be avoided. This will create a healthier impact and actually serve to strengthen the hands of the UN.

True Neutrality. Peacekeeping must construe ideal neutrality; such forces must always display true impartiality. Any impression created to the contrary can seriously jeopardize the success of the operation. Peace enforcement, in particular, must be handled with care and caution for it may not necessarily construe neutrality; it could be interpreted as interference in the affairs of a nation, or even colonialism in contemporary dress.<sup>58</sup>

Relationship With Other Regional Security Organizations. In the past, peacekeeping forces have either been sponsored by the UN or other member nations, exclusively at the behest of the warring parties. There has however, been little regional initiative. If we have to strengthen the UN and give it more 'credibility' in the eyes of the world, and more so the contentious states, then it is essential for the UN to promptly sponsor regional initiatives initially, and subsequently employ UN peacekeeping forces, when necessary. This brings out the need for such organizations to additionally play a role under the UN. There is thus an urgent need for:

(a) Fostering and strengthening regional multilateral pacts with special emphasis on peacekeeping and confidence building measures, and supporting re-structuring of these in a way that they are seen as truly balanced and impartial arbitrators of peace.

(b) Provide ideal and material support to them, and bring them closer to the UN just as the NATO has moved.

(b) Ensuring a formal tie-up between such organizations and the UN insofar as matters related to peacekeeping are concerned.

(c) The former can then work as a buffer and reduce the load on the UN, but must act promptly to pre-empt/prevent conflict and institute all measures to ensure peace in the region before the need is felt for the UN to step in.

(d) Where regional pacts do not exist, fresh regional initiatives should be promoted and strongly encouraged. Failing this, UN sponsored regional bodies should be launched.

(e) The UN should also exchange liaison officers and information with all regional organizations.

## CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS

Today the international community can again act as it did 45 years ago to prevent war. The need to look back historically has focussed us onto the problem. The UN is obligated to maintain international peace and security. It must however, change. We have come a long way since the days of San Francisco in 1945. A five power Security Council is a thing of the past. The current members are unlikely to leave, so we should be prepared to add members, but with great care, in the hope of attaining a stronger voice. Integration and consensus are the by words. UN deterrence can thus be a reality.

Peacekeepers are stretched to the limit today, while demands for their service increase by the day. Despite the many limitations, handicaps and restraints, their operations have shown that the UN brand of peacekeeping has very promising potential and represents a viable alternative to enforcement methods.<sup>59</sup> Future peacekeeping operations can be mounted with much greater efficiency and effectiveness than formerly.<sup>60</sup>

There was a lot of euphoria in 1988-89 after the Cold War abated. The tempo however, appears to be dropping to a degree. We must not allow this to happen. The international community has waited expectantly for the UN to do something. It would be a sad day if we let this chance slip by.

Though we are still a long way from the purple leadership

concept, and a relative state of flux is likely to continue in which there may be no major conflict and yet there may be no peace or tranquility in the true sense. Those who are looking for the ideal must be naive. We must ask ourselves as to what is the ideal, and do we really need it. We must endeavor to create a future of 'common interests' in order to eradicate such ethnic affiliations that fuel fires.

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